The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) significantly expanded public insurance eligibility and coverage for children in "working poor" families. Despite this success, it is estimated that over 6 million children who are eligible for public insurance remain uninsured. An important first step for designing strategies to increase enrollment of eligible but uninsured children is to determine how the take-up of public coverage varies within the population. Because of their low rates of insurance coverage and unique enrollment barriers, children of immigrants are an especially important group to consider. We compare the effect of SCHIP eligibility on the insurance coverage of children of foreign-born and native-born parents. In contrast to research on the earlier Medicaid expansions, we find similar take-up rates for the two groups. This suggests that state outreach strategies were not only effective at increasing take-up overall, but were successful in reducing disparities in access to coverage.
I. Introduction
In the past two decades there have been substantial initiatives at the state and federal levels aimed at increasing insurance coverage among children. Most recently, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) expanded public insurance eligibility for children in "working poor" families. SCHIP significantly increased public insurance coverage and decreased the rate of uninsured among children in families with incomes between 100 and 300 percent of the federal poverty level (Cunningham, Hadley and Reschovsky 2002; Lo Sasso and Buchmueller 2004; Hudson, Selden and Banthin 2005) . By 2002, roughly half of all children in the US were income-eligible for some kind of public health insurance (Selden, Hudson and Banthin 2004) . However, despite this success, it is estimated that over 6 million children who are eligible for public insurance remain uninsured. These children represent a majority of all uninsured children. Extending coverage to these eligible but uninsured children is an important but challenging objective for federal and state policy makers.
A crucial first step for addressing this problem is to determine how the take-up of public coverage varies within the population. Children of immigrants are an especially important and growing group to consider. One in five children under age 18 is either an immigrant or is a member of an immigrant family; since 1990 the number of children in immigrant families has risen seven times faster than the number in native families (Morse 2000) . Previous research shows that foreign-born adults are nearly three times as likely to be uninsured as native-born Americans (Buchmueller et al 2007) and that children of immigrants are also more likely to be uninsured than children whose parents were born in the US (Ku and Matani 2001) . Immigrants' lower rate of insurance coverage is driven mainly by a lower rate of employer-sponsored insurance, which in turn is largely explained by differences in human capital and the types of jobs held by immigrants and native-born workers. While this makes public insurance more important as a source of coverage for children of immigrants, because of language and cultural barriers they may be less likely than children in non-immigrant families to enroll.
Despite the well documented gap in insurance coverage, there has been surprisingly little research on how public insurance take-up differs between immigrants and natives. One study of the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s found a weaker response to Medicaid eligibility among children of foreign-born parents as compared to children whose parents were born in the US (Currie 1999) . Because SCHIP was enacted just after the 1996 Federal welfare reform legislation, which singled out recent immigrants for less generous benefits, there is additional reason to expect a lower take-up of SCHIP among the children of immigrants. On the other hand, the SCHIP legislation included much greater emphasis on outreach, including marketing campaigns in languages other than English (Aizer 2003 (Aizer , 2007 . If these efforts were effective, they might have reduced nativity-related differences in take-up.
Because non-natives are so much less likely to have private insurance than natives, it is possible that the problem of "crowd-out"-i.e., the substitution of public insurance for private coverage-may be less of an issue for immigrants. However, one study on the impact of welfare reform on health insurance finds that reductions in public coverage among immigrants were completely offset by increases in private coverage, a striking finding implying 100% substitution of private coverage for public coverage (Borjas 2003) .
In this paper we test whether the effect of the SCHIP expansion was different for children of foreign-born and US-born parents. The analysis is based on repeat cross-section data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the same research design employed successfully in previous research on the effects of Medicaid and SCHIP expansions on insurance coverage for the entire population of children (Currie and Gruber 1996; Cutler and Gruber 1996; Ham and ShoreSheppard 2001; Lo Sasso and Buchmueller 2004; Hudson, Selden and Banthin 2005) . Specifically, we use an instrumental variables approach in which the effect of SCHIP eligibility is identified by cross-state differences in the timing and extent of changes in the income eligibility limit over the period from 1996 to 2000. We test for the effect of SCHIP on insurance coverage from any source as well as on the probability of having public insurance (take-up) and on the probability of having private coverage (crowd-out).
In contrast to earlier research on the Medicaid expansions, our results suggest that SCHIP take-up among the children of the foreign born was at least as high as natives. Estimates of the effect of eligibility on reported coverage by any private insurance suggest that there was little crowd-out for either group. However, earlier work on SCHIP suggests that some survey respondents misclassify public insurance provided through private carriers as private, nongroup coverage. Correcting for this misclassification tends to increase take-up estimates and increase crowd-out estimates for both groups. The range of crowdout estimates is generally similar for natives and non-natives.
II.
Background and Previous Literature The SCHIP Program SCHIP was established by Federal legislation in 1997 and enacted by states over the next several years. Like prior studies, we exploit variation in the timing and extent of the SCHIP eligibility expansions to identify effects on coverage.
Eleven states implemented their program in 1997, 34 did so in 1998 and by 2000 every state had a program in place. Cross-state variation in the extent of expansion comes from differences in income thresholds both before and after implementation. Prior to SCHIP, states were required to cover children 6 years of age and under up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), though they were allowed to expand coverage up to 185 percent and still receive federal matching dollars.
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Because there were no such Federal standards for older children, there was much more variation in eligibility limits. Since the implementation of SCHIP, in most states income eligibility limits are the same for children of all ages. In 2000, the last year of our data, the modal income eligibility threshold was 200% of the FPL (18 states). Nine states expanded eligibility even further and the other 26 states had income limits of 133% to 192% of the FPL.
Because states were given considerable flexibility, state programs vary in other dimensions as well (Wolfe and Scrivner 2005; Bansak and Raphael 2007) . States were given the option of expanding their Medicaid program, establishing a new stand-alone program, or both. The SCHIP legislation required states to implement mechanisms to limit the crowding out of private insurance, but did not prescribe a specific approach. The most common strategy that states have adopted is to require that children must have been without insurance for some period prior to enrolling. Thirty three states have such waiting periods of three to twelve months. Some prior studies indicate that these mandatory waiting periods have been effective at reducing the substitution of public insurance for private coverage (LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004; Kronebusch and Elbel 2004; Bansak and Raphael 2007) , though a recent study by Gruber and Simon (2007) find that they had no effect.
Compared to the earlier Medicaid expansions the SCHIP legislation placed a greater emphasis on and provided more funding for outreach efforts. States were allowed to experiment with different strategies for disseminating information about the program, simplifying the application and enrollment process and improving retention. These efforts may explain why SCHIP appears to have had a stronger effect on public insurance coverage than earlier Medicaid expansions that were targeted at children in families with incomes above the poverty line. LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) , Hudson, Selden and Banthin (2005) and Bansak and Raphael (2007) find that 8 to 10% of children who gained income eligibility for SCHIP enrolled in the program. While this take-up rate may seem low, it is comparable to the rate that Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) estimate for an earlier Medicaid expansion targeted at children in families with incomes up to 100% of the FPL and larger than what they find for expansions affecting children with family incomes between 100% and 133% of the FPL. Moreover, because these SCHIP take-up estimates do not account for the fact that many children who meet income eligibility rules are not actually eligible for SCHIP because they already have private coverage, they understate take-up among children meeting all eligibility requirements (Cunningham 2003) .
Immigrants and Public Health Insurance
The existing study that is most similar to ours is one by Currie (1999) that compares the response of children of immigrants and children with native-born parents to Medicaid expansions occurring between 1989 and 1992. Currie finds that increased eligibility led to higher Medicaid enrollment among children of native-born parents, but had no significant effect for children of immigrants. Medicaid eligibility did reduce private insurance coverage for immigrant children, however. She interprets this pattern as indicating that the Medicaid expansions induced some immigrant parents to drop private coverage in favor of the "conditional coverage" for emergency care to which they were entitled even if they did not formally enroll in the program. Families that drop private coverage when they become eligible for Medicaid reap a financial benefit by forgoing monthly premium contributions while maintaining the ability to receive free care in the case of emergency. However, conditional coverage is not likely to improve access to primary or preventive health care. Indeed, while Currie finds that increased program eligibility led to greater use of ambulatory care for children of native-born parents, she finds no effect for children of immigrants.
SCHIP was passed shortly after the landmark federal welfare reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). In addition to setting time limits for cash welfare payments, PRWORA restricted the eligibility of immigrants for welfare and other public programs, including Medicaid. Under Federal law, immigrants arriving in the US after 1996 are prohibited from receiving Medicaid for five years. However, states have the option of using their own funds to insure new immigrants and a number have done so. Fourteen states used their own funds to provide Medicaid benefits to recent immigrants (Tumlin et al. 1999) . Initially, the legislation also restricted eligibility for immigrants arriving prior to 1996, though those provisions were never enacted. Nonetheless, some analysts argue that by creating confusion about eligibility rules and contributing to fears of deportation, PRWORA had a "chilling effect", decreasing program participation among immigrants who remained eligible for these programs Passel 1999, 2002; Borjas 2001 Borjas , 2003 Kaushal and Kaestner 2005; Lurie 2007 ). Several studies show that since the enactment of PRWORA, the rate of Medicaid enrollment has fallen and that the decline is greater for foreign-born compared to native-born persons (Borjas 2003; Kandula et al. 2004; Kaushal and Kaestner 2005) .
While welfare reform may have depressed public insurance enrollment of immigrants and their children relative to natives, some of the strategies that states used to increase SCHIP take-up are likely to have worked in the opposite direction. It is widely believed that the complexity of Medicaid eligibility rules and administrative procedures was a barrier to enrollment that limited the impact of earlier eligibility expansions. Some of these administrative reforms were specifically targeted at immigrant families. For example, parents are not required to provide proof of their own citizenship when applying for SCHIP coverage for their children and procedures for verifying the legal status of the children were greatly simplified. Other administrative reforms, such as the use of shorter application forms and reductions in the amount of documentation required, while not directly targeted at immigrants, may have been especially beneficial to families with little prior experience with the system and limited English proficiency.
States with large immigrant populations have tailored their outreach efforts to meet the needs of those populations. Several states use communitybased organizations to identify eligible families and to assist them with the application process. Aizer (2003 Aizer ( , 2007 studies the effect of such organizations in California. She finds that proximity to an organization providing bilingual application assistance increased public insurance enrollment by up to 46 percent for Hispanic and Asian children. She also finds a significant effect of Spanish language television ads on the enrollment of Hispanic children.
III. Data
Our data are drawn from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years of 1997 to 2001, which provide information on household health insurance coverage for the period from 1996 to 2000. 3 Since most states enacted SCHIP in 1998, this provides between two to three years of data prior to the enactment of SCHIP and two to three years after. After 2001, income eligibility limits largely remained constant, but some states responded to the recession by limiting SCHIP and Medicaid enrollment in other ways, such as adding monthly premiums or reversing earlier administrative simplifications; at the same time, other states pursued parental expansions using SCHIP funds. 4 Because modeling these alternative expansion strategies adds considerable complexity and creates greater potential policy endogeneity problems we opt to examine the initial program implementation by studying the period through 2000. These five years of data provide a sample size of 181,402 children who are less than 18 years old, living with their parents and not heads of their own households. Because parental nativity is a key variable in our analysis, we exclude observations for which parental information is not available, giving us a sample of 167,298.
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A key methodological issue for this analysis concerns the way children are categorized according to their parents' nativity. In our main analysis, we follow Borjas (2003) in categorizing children based on the nativity of the head of their household. In the full sample, we have 130,689 children in families headed by a native-born adult (hereafter "natives") and 36,609 children in families where the household head is foreign-born (hereafter "non-natives"). We obtain similar results when we define non-native children as those with at least one foreign-born parent.
6 Table 1 provides summary statistics for native and non-native children. As has been previously documented, non-natives have considerably higher uninsurance rates and considerably lower private insurance coverage rates, regardless of whether we restrict the sample to those in families at or below 300% of the federal poverty level. Note also that the vast majority of children in immigrant families are themselves native-born citizens.
IV. Estimation Strategy
We use the repeated cross-section data from the CPS to estimate several versions of the following regression model:
where the dependent variable COVERAGE i represents the type of health insurance 4 Several recent studies examine the effect of premiums on SCHIP enrollment in selected states (Kenney et al. 2006/07; Herndon et al. 2007; Marton 2007) . Two other studies use national data to model the effect of state policies that expanded eligibility to parents (Aizer and Grogger 2003; Busch and Duchovny 2005) . 5 The primary reason why these children are dropped from the sample is because they do not live with their parents. As a result, not surprisingly, dropped children tend to be on average 4.5 years older than included children. The dropped children also are more likely to be black (24% versus 15%) and less likely to be white (42% versus 53%), though they are roughly equally likely to be Hispanic (27% versus 26%). This last point suggests that they should not differ greatly on the extent to which they are children of foreign born parents. 6 These results are not reported, but are available upon request.
held by child i: public, private, or uninsured. 7 PUBELIG is an indicator for public insurance eligibility, which is constructed based on the child's age, family income and the eligibility standards effective in the child's state of residence at that time. 8 The vector X includes the child's age and standard socio-demographic characteristics. We include a full set of year and state dummies to account for national trends in health insurance coverage and long-standing differences across states. The equation is estimated using a linear probability models for each insurance type.
All models are estimated on samples that are stratified by nativity. Given the link between employment and health insurance coverage in the US, our baseline specification includes several variables to account for the possibility that the state and year dummies do not fully capture changes in labor market opportunities for different subpopulations. We interact the year dummies with categorical variables for education and race to account for the fact that workers in different "skill" groups may have been affected differently by changes in macroeconomic conditions over this period. To account for state-specific economic shocks, we also include several regressors that vary by state and year: the state-level unemployment rate, the gross state product (GSP) and the percentage of the state's population receiving cash welfare benefits each year. The unemployment rate and GSP are included to account for the relationship between local area macroeconomic conditions and insurance that has been documented by prior studies (Cawley and Simon 2003; Glied and Jack 2003) . The average caseload is intended to capture cross-state differences in the effect of welfare reform. We also estimate models that replace these state-level variables with full state/year interactions. This specification has the advantage of accounting for possible state-specific macroeconomic shocks in the most flexible way. However, it demands a lot of the data, leaving little residual variation for identifying the effect of SCHIP.
As noted, most states restrict SCHIP eligibility to children who have been without private insurance for a certain period of time. Because this eligibility criterion is based on one of our outcome variables, we cannot incorporate it directly in the construction of PUBELIG. Therefore, our regression estimates will understate the marginal take-up rate among children meeting all eligibility criteria. A rough adjustment can be made by dividing the coefficient on 7 Within insurance categories, the CPS provides no detail on the type or quality of coverage. Therefore, while it is clear that there is significant variation across private insurance plans (and to lesser extent across state programs) in benefit levels, cost-sharing and other aspects of the quantity or quality of coverage, it is not possible to account for such differences in our analysis. 8 Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004) estimate models that allow for differences between states that implemented SCHIP by expanding their existing Medicaid programs and those that established new stand-alone programs. Because those models indicate no statistically significant differences between these two approaches, we use a single measure of eligibility for public insurance.
PUBELIG by the percent of children in the sample who were uninsured. In addition, because there is variation across states in the length of the waiting period, we can estimate the effect of this policy parameter on coverage by augmenting the regression model as follows:
In this equation, MONTHS represents the number of months a child who meets the program's income eligibility standards must be uninsured before qualifying for SCHIP. In the pre-SCHIP period this variable will take the value of zero for all children. In the post-SCHIP period, it will be zero for children in states without any waiting periods and for children eligible for Medicaid rather than SCHIP; it will be non-zero for children eligible for an SCHIP related expansion program for states that employed waiting periods. 9 We expect the length of the waiting period to have a negative effect on public coverage. If the waiting period was effective at reducing crowd-out, the effect on private coverage should be positive.
During the time period we analyze, many states contracted with private insurers to provide coverage to SCHIP and Medicaid beneficiaries; others designed their programs to resemble private insurance in order to reduce stigma and thereby make coverage more attractive. These strategies might make it difficult to distinguish public and private insurance in surveys like the CPS as many parents whose children are covered through Medicaid or SCHIP may report that coverage as private non-group. Such classification errors would explain the finding that increases in public insurance eligibility caused by the implementation of SCHIP was associated with an increase in the percentage of CPS respondents reporting that their children had private non-group coverage (Lo Sasso and Buchmueller 2004) . Cantor et al. (2007) provide additional evidence that supports this interpretation.
There is less reason to expect public insurance to be reported as group coverage because explicit mention to an employer or union is made in the questionnaire. Therefore, in addition to estimating models that assume the reported insurance variables as accurate, we estimate models in which the dependent variable equals one if either public insurance or non-group private insurance is reported. This composite variable should capture all increases in 9 In order to assign a value of MONTHS to children, it is necessary to infer SCHIP eligibility based on family income. Hence there is an implicit public eligibility calculation in creating MONTHS, leading to the likely endogeneity of the variable. We instrument for MONTHS using the interaction of simulated eligibility (described below) with the state's waiting period. public insurance coverage, whether they be accurately reported or misreported as increases in non-group private coverage.
To account for the endogeneity of public insurance eligibility, we use the same instrumental variables strategy as previous studies on eligibility expansions (Currie and Gruber 1996; Cutler and Gruber 1996; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2001; Lo Sasso and Buchmueller 2004; Hudson, Selden and Banthin 2005) . Specifically, we instrument for PUBELIG using a simulated eligibility measure generated by applying the eligibility rules for each state in each year to a nationally representative sample of children. The instrument is the mean imputed eligibility for each state-year-age combination. 10 Because our model includes state and year fixed effects, identification comes from variation within states in the timing of SCHIP implementation and the extent to which SCHIP raised income eligibility limits. Additional within-state variation comes from the fact that the magnitude of the eligibility changes differed by child age.
The variation in eligibility affects children in families with incomes less than 300% of the FPL. Fitting the models to a sample of all children assumes that in the absence of SCHIP, trends in insurance coverage for children in the SCHIP "target group" would have been similar to children in higher income families, who remained ineligible for public insurance. Our results will be subject to bias if this assumption does not hold. However, selecting on income introduces the potential for endogenous sample selection bias. Therefore, while we present findings for the sample of children in families with incomes below 300% of the FPL, we also estimate the same models for the full sample of children. The results for the full sample (which are available upon request) are very similar to the lower income sample results, lending credibility to our identification strategy.
V. Results

Trends in Public Insurance Eligibility and Insurance Coverage
Before turning to the regression results, we present unadjusted trends in public insurance eligibility and insurance coverage in Table 2 . In addition to reporting data for the full samples of native and non-native children, we report results for children in families with incomes below the poverty line and those with family incomes between 100% and 300% of the FPL. The latter group can be viewed as the target of the SCHIP expansions.
The full sample results (panel A) show that in 1996, non-native children were significantly more likely to be eligible for public health insurance: 44% vs. 10 The simulated eligibility measure in the first stage regression is strongly predictive of public eligibility: depending on specification (children of immigrants versus natives, with and without state-year interactions) the t-statistics on the simulated eligibility instrument in the first stage range from 16.17 to 33.47. 27%. Eligibility increased in the next three years. It leveled off for natives between 1999 and 2000 and fell for non-natives. The latter result is likely caused by a combination of changes in family income and sampling error as no states restricted eligibility between 1999 and 2000. By 2000, 58% of non-native children and 39% of natives were eligible for either Medicaid or a stand-alone SCHIP program. However, for both groups, actual public coverage actually fell between 1996 and 1998, before increasing modestly by the end of the period. Private insurance coverage increased by roughly 4 percentage points for both groups causing the percentage without insurance to decline slightly.
The data for children in families with incomes below the poverty line (Panel B) suggest that the decline in public insurance coverage between 1996 and 1998 was potentially a result of welfare reform, as documented in prior studies (Garrett and Holahan 2000; Kaestner and Kaushal 2003; Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes 2005; Cawley, Schroeder and Simon 2006) . The data on eligibility indicate that for the most part these children were not directly affected by the SCHIP eligibility expansions: in 1996 over 90% were already eligible for Medicaid. It has been suggested, however, that Medicaid enrollment of already eligible children increased as a result of SCHIP outreach efforts. This may explain why the percentage of poor children with public insurance increased after 1998. Private insurance increased for both groups, with a slightly larger change for natives. The net effect was a reduction in the uninsured rate of between 1 and 2 percentage points.
The increase in public insurance eligibility over this period was concentrated among children with family incomes between 100 and 300% of the FPL (Panel C). In 1996, only 13% of children in this income range were eligible for Medicaid. By 2000, nearly half of native children and almost three-fifths of non-natives were eligible. For both groups actual public enrollment fell in 1997 but increased thereafter. The growth in enrollment was stronger for non-natives (a change of 10 percentage points) than for natives (3 percentage points). These unadjusted figures imply that the marginal take-up rate was roughly three times as large for non-natives compared to natives: 29.5% vs. 9.5% percent. However, recall that our eligibility measure does not account for the fact that in most states children who already had private insurance were not eligible for SCHIP. We can do a rough adjustment by dividing these figures by the percentage of children without private insurance. Doing the adjustment based on the 1996 values implies that 43% of native children (0.095/[1 -0.776]) and 68% of non-native children (0.295/[1 -0.570]) who met income eligibility requirements and did not have private insurance took up SCHIP coverage. There was essentially no change in private coverage among native children in this income group and a decline of 1.9 percentage points for non-natives.
Regression Results
The first set of regression results is reported in Table 3 . Results from our baseline model (Equation 1) are reported in columns 1 (natives) and 2 (non-natives). The results in columns 3 and 4 are from models in which we include state and year interaction terms. State-year interactions allow our model to account for very general forms of policy endogeneity. However, because there is less policy variation within cells defined by state and year, we anticipate larger standard errors. Because of this trade-off we choose to present both sets of estimates.
In panel A the dependent variable equals one for children who are reported to have public insurance coverage and zero for those without public coverage. For both groups and both specifications, the coefficient on our eligibility variable is positive and statistically significant. For natives, the estimated coefficient on PUBELIG is .067 in the baseline model and .061 in the model with state-year interaction terms. Contrary to what might have been expected based on Currie's (1999) results, eligibility for public insurance has a larger effect on the public insurance coverage of non-native children. The PUBELIG coefficient is .103 in column 2 and .123 in column 4. We find a negative but statistically insignificant effect of public eligibility on the probability that a child is reported to be covered by private health insurance (Panel B) . The effect appears somewhat more negative for non-natives, though as with natives the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. As a result, when the dependent variable equals one for children who are uninsured (Panel C), the estimated coefficients on the eligibility variable are negative and of a comparable magnitude as the positive coefficients in the take-up model. Table 4 presents results from estimates of equation (2), in which the eligibility variable is interacted with the number of months the state requires a child to be uninsured before enrolling in SCHIP. The expectation is that the coefficient on the length of the waiting period should be negative in the take-up regression and positive in the private insurance regression. This is, in fact, what we find for both natives and non-natives. This indicates that waiting periods have the intended effect of reducing crowd-out and, by achieving this goal, reducing public coverage. In particular, each additional month in a state's waiting period reduces take-up by roughly 2 percentage points for both the native and non-native groups. The results also imply that if states had no waiting period, take-up rates would range from 9% to 13% for natives and 16% to 17% for non-natives, which is considerably higher than the average take-up rates observed in Table 3 . Table 5 presents results that combine stated private non-group coverage with public coverage to account for the aforementioned potential misclassification problem and private group insurance. Private non-group coverage should not be increased by the SCHIP expansions-indeed, one might expect non-group coverage to fall as more people with non-group insurance become eligible for SCHIP. However, as noted prior work has found that non-group coverage appears to increase with the implementation of SCHIP (Lo Sasso and Buchmueller 2004) , suggesting that respondents in the CPS might not understand that their coverage is provided through Medicaid/SCHIP via a private carrier or with a new name that does not evoke a state-sponsored program. Premium requirements for SCHIP in some states might also lead to confusion in responding to CPS insurance coverage questions. Such misinterpretations might be even more common among non-natives as they may lack familiarity with public programs. The CPS is clearer in asking about private group coverage, specifying the need for an employer or union's sponsorship of the insurance coverage.
The results in Table 5 indicate that for non-natives the SCHIP eligibility expansion is associated with a decrease in private group coverage and higher public/non-group coverage. The point estimates suggest that when accounting for potential reporting errors by non-natives public coverage might be 2-3 percentage points higher. By contrast for natives the differences between the effect of SCHIP on public coverage in Tables 3 and 5 are slight, suggesting little evidence of misreporting. For both groups, waiting period effects are generally consistent with our expectations.
There are two ways to measure the extent to which the increase in public insurance coverage is offset by a decline in private coverage. One measure is the ratio of the estimated eligibility coefficient from the private insurance regression to the corresponding parameter estimate from the public insurance equation (a priv /a pub ). The other measure is one minus the ratio of the coefficient from the uninsured regression to the coefficient from the public insurance regression (1 -a unins /a pub ). When we treat reported insurance coverage as accurate, the crowd-out estimates range from 7% to 38% for non-natives and from 13% to 26% for natives, depending on the regression specification and crowd-out formula used. If we assume that increases in reported non-group coverage are really increases in public insurance, the crowd-out estimates range from 19% to 57% for non-natives and from 3% to 52% for natives. It should be noted that not only do the point estimates vary considerably across different specifications, but the different crowd-out values are estimated imprecisely and rarely can rule out a zero value with 95% confidence.
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11 Note for example that the 95% confidence interval for the high-end crowd-out estimate for nonnatives of 57% is -1% to 115%; the 95% confidence interval for the high-end crowd-out estimate for natives of 52% for natives is -57% to 162%. The standard errors used to construct these confidence intervals are calculated using the delta method.
VI. Discussion
While the public insurance expansions of the past two decades have been generally successful, a high fraction of eligible children remain uninsured. Devising strategies to increase enrollment among eligible children requires an understanding of how take-up varies within the population. Children of immigrants are a vulnerable group who face special barriers and challenges with respect to public insurance enrollment. Previous research suggests that the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s did little to increase insurance coverage or access to care for this group. In this paper we test for differential impacts of eligibility for the State Children's Health Insurance Program on children of native-born and foreign-born adults.
In implementing SCHIP, states did a number of things to simplify the enrollment process and to reduce barriers to take-up. Some of the administrative reforms were targeted at immigrant families. Relative to prior Medicaid expansions, with SCHIP there was greater emphasis on and funding for outreach. In many states, outreach programs were tailored to the culturally and linguistically diverse population of eligible children. Our results suggest that these strategies were effective at increasing the health insurance coverage of children of both native-born and foreign-born parents.
It is important to note, however, that our analysis is based on the early years of the SCHIP program. In subsequent years, many states responded to recession-induced budget problems by reversing some of the administrative reforms that appear to have been successful in increasing take-up. The difficult fiscal situation also reduced funding for outreach. These changes are likely to have reduced enrollment in general. To the extent that administrative hurdles and complexity in the application process represent greater barriers for foreign-born parents, we would expect them to have a greater impact on their children.
Recent Federal legislation, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, further modified the Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility rules. In the case of Medicaid, these changes include significantly stricter requirements for proving citizenship. Whereas during the period of our analysis it was sufficient for parents to provide an oral affirmation of citizenship status when applying for Medicaid coverage for their children, the new legislation requires written documentation, such as a passport or birth certificate (Rosenbaum and Markus 2006) . Since these new rules went into effect in July 2006, several states have reported a decline in Medicaid enrollment (Cohen Ross 2007) . This further raises concerns about whether the success in insuring the children of working poor families that was achieved in the early years of SCHIP can be maintained. Results are based on regressions using March CPS data from 1997 to 2001. All regressions control for public eligibility (instrumented with simulated eligibility), state AFDC/TANF caseload, state unemployment rate, GSP, number of persons in the family, whether a single mother or father is present in the household versus two parent household, gender, race (black, Hispanic, other) interacted with time indicators, number of workers in the household, whether anyone in the household works for a large firm indicators for the number of people in the household with some college education interacted with time indicators, number of people in the house in fair or poor health, residence in an urban area, child age indicators, and state and time indicators. Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. * 0.05 < p < 0.10 ** 0.01 < p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 Table 3 . * 0.05 < p < 0.10 ** 0.01 < p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
